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Abstract
Since the mid-1980s, the mismanagement of European economic policy has appeared as one of the 
main causes of the slow growth. After the brief 1998 - 2000 recovery, the blocking factors are again 
fully at play. The EU is all the more up against the wall as its enlargement to Eastern Europe repre-
sents an additional challenge. The EU is locked into a slow growth process and rising inequalities be-
cause of its institutional framework. Manifestations of its decline are multifarious. Most of the princi-
ples currently governing the EU are at issue. The welfare systems which appeared as one of the pillars 
of European societies have been gradually questioned. Alternative proposals are sketched out, laying 
first the emphasis on macroeconomic policies (European budget, ECB, wage policy, revival of the European 
Social Model) . A new design of structural policies is proposed (an active research policy, an industrial pol-
icy, the reinforcement of public services, a preserved regional policy to assure cohesion, a reformed common agricul-
tural policy, a more balanced trade policy) . However, these proposals seem far removed from what can be 
ultimately expected from a EU- 25. Several new leads could be envisaged within the framework of a 
Europe with differentiated management systems but capable of maintaining a cohesion policy and 
supporting large structuring programmes.
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Since the mid-1980s, the mismanagement of Europe's economic policy has appeared as one of the 
main causes of the distortion between European and American growth rates. The EMS was func-
tioning asymmetrically and the countries with weak currencies beard the adjustment costs bur-
den. In 1985, instead of bringing solutions to the already identified blocking factors, it was de-
cided to use market forces to rekindle Europe with the Single Market programme. According to 
the then prevailing liberal approach, growth and innovation were to be encouraged by both the 
completion of a large domestic market and the reinforcement of competition. In the early 1990s, 
financial liberalisation and the increasingly rigid EMS mechanisms made a change of the mone-
tary regime necessary. The single currency prevailed without the obvious consequences in terms 
of economic policy organisation being ever envisaged. The project was shaky from the very be-
ginning. However, the benefits of the single currency were thought to be determining and its 
costs largely underestimated. Furthermore, the transitory measures towards the single currency 
adopted in Maastricht in December 1991, added to the aftermath of the German reunification, 
contributed to the halt of European growth during the long 1992-1998 transition period. After the 
brief 1998-2000 recovery, the blocking factors were fully at play again and the risks of an eco-
nomic slide reappeared. The welfare systems which were specific to each country and appeared 
as one of the pillars of European societies have since then been gradually questioned. The EU is 
all the more up against the wall as its enlargement to Eastern Europe represents an additional 
challenge. 
The European Constitution project was a kind of answer, though largely open to criticism. Its re-
jection was salutary but did not result in a "plan B". The EU is still suffering from persistent para-
lysis and is locked into a slow growth process and rising inequalities (1) . Alternative proposals are 
sketched out, laying the emphasis on macroeconomic policies and the European Social Model(2) 
as well as on structural policies (3) . However, they seem far removed from what can be ultimately 
expected from a EU- 25. Several new leads could be envisaged within the framework of a Europe 
with differentiated management systems but capable of maintaining a cohesion policy and sup-
porting large structuring programmes (4) . 
     1. A persistent paralysis 
The EU is locked into a slow growth process because of its institutional framework. Manifesta-
tions of its decline are multifarious. Most of the principles currently governing the EU are at is-
sue. 
The Growth and Stability Pact (GSP) has clearly shown its pernicious effects and its theoretical 
foundations have been much questioned (Creel and alii, 2002 ; Mathieu and Sterdyniak, 2003) . In the-
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ory, the GSP has two functions within the framework of a monetary union. On the one hand, it is 
supposed to avoid a member country's insolvency and on the other one to prevent a country's 
budgetary laxity from resulting in negative externalities through higher interest rates. Both func-
tions are badly carried out by GSP current instruments. Monitoring the public debt ratio in GDP 
% can prevent insolvency problems. The rules on the  3% of GDP ceiling and on convergence in 
order to reach medium-term budgetary equilibrium do not take into account the less indebted 
countries' rooms for manoeuvre. They do not include either the positive effects on growth of pub-
lic investments or education and research spending which are eroded by the GSP constraints . As 
for externalities on interest rates, the public deficit criterion is also ill-adapted. These externalities 
only appear in case of a higher rate of inflation or a significant levy on the area's saving . The 
most adequate ratio to appreciate these effects is the current account balance in GDP % which in-
tegrates both adjustments of public and private savings and investment. A country like Germany 
with a simultaneous significant public deficit and big trade surplus should not be concerned . 
Maintaining the GSP in its current form is little justified and is the first reason why European 
economies are locked into a slow growth process. The flexible measures adopted in 2005 bring 
only a very partial answer. 
The ECB's independence is reinforced with price stability as its main goal (an inflation rate inferior 
to 2%) . The ECB's status is unique in the world. In the absence of a European federal authority, 
the ECB's autonomy in terms of monetary and exchange policy is broader than the Fed's in 
America or the previous Bundesbank's. The exchange policy ac'- "omes under the ECB's sole 
competence and evolutions of the euro have been hardly confront, 2e 1999. Following the 
positive effects of the initial depreciation of the euro, the risk of a lasting overvaluation has been 
present since 2004. Improvements brought to the functioning of the Eurogroup are modest. The 
problem of the external representation of the euro zone has not been solved yet. Unlike in the 
United States, no reference is made to the goal to preserve growth and employment . The com-
mon monetary policy is ill-adapted to countries whose evolutions are asymmetrical . It is too re-
strictive for countries in recession and too laxist for those that are submitted to inflationary pres-
sures. The ECB's recent project to introduce differentiation between the government securities it 
will accept as a source of refinancing according to the borrower's rating reinforces the pressure . 
Such a general conception of monetary policy is a second factor little contributing to sustainable 
growth. Competition rules repeatedly refer to principles of an open market economy and non-
biased competition. State subsidies which are compatible with domestic markets are narrowly 
controlled. Conversely, the interventions likely to be made at European level to stimulate supply 
in such areas as R&D, education as well as subsidies to the industrial sector and to large infra-
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structure programmes remain extremely modest. Given the current constrained national policies 
and limited community interventions, structural policies are unable to overcome accumulated 
backwardness. It then appears that long-term growth does not get any support. 
The areas of employment and social policies are subjected to mere, non-constraining "open coor-
dination methods", based on the exchange of information and best practices. No provision has 
been made in terms of wage policy, which would however represent a major stake within the 
framework of an enlarged policy mix. The "macroeconomic dialogue", introduced in the Koln 
process in 1999 and gathering the ECB, national governments and European trade unions has 
been deprived of all its substance, with the ECB solely announcing its orientations without any 
prior dialogue. The development of a vicious circle with a downward pressure on wages and costs 
in each member country contributing to stop the growth process is no mere school hypothesis. 
Lastly, a Social Europe is theoretically one of the goals of the European construction, which re-
sulted in the implementation of Social and Structural Funds or the adoption of the Charter of Fun-
damental Rights. However, social policy comes under the sole competence of national states. Not-
withstanding each country's strong specificities, it is at the heart of the European model and is 
threatened with decline in many respects. First of all, social welfare is increasingly analysed in 
public debates under the sole aspect of its costs. "Social costs" must be lowered in order to pre-
serve employment and develop competitiveness. The analysis of budgetary constraints, linked to 
increasing health care and pension costs, is biased. Social welfare is increasingly controlled by 
European authorities because of its impact on public accounting. Secondly, welfare expenditures 
provide a new field for private capital accumulation in such areas as pensions or health care. A 
new, increasingly non-egalitarian and costly model is taking shape, based on privatisation. The 
calling into question of social welfare is used to discipline the workforce. It is a matter of "work-
fare" vs. "welfare". Lastly, the Bolkenstein directive, concerning services on domestic markets 
and which is still being discussed, directly threatens social welfare and public services. Its insis-
tence on the enforcement of the "country of origin principle" may encourage social dumping.
All in all, the construction of a liberal Europe is going ahead and problems of its functioning re-
main unsolved, particularly within the euro zone. The easy financing in euros of intracommunity 
deficits represents a growth asset in the euro zone. However, given the disappearance of ex-
change rates as adjustment variables, the mechanisms for a return to equilibrium in a context of 
asymmetrical evolutions do not seem to be adequate. Each country will react very differently in 
the event of a similarly important shock (Mazier and Saglio, 2004) . Without a federal budget and 
with national budgetary policies that are constrained by the GSP, the Monetary Union is helpless
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when faced with asymmetrical shocks. Pressure on prices and costs remains the  only answer and 
may still become stronger, thus contributing to locking the EU into a slow growth process.
The various studies that have been carried out these last years to improve the coordination proc-
ess have led to very few operational results (Jacquet and Pisani-Ferry, 2000) . The Broad Economic 
Policy Guidelines that are submitted each year by the Commission represent a very conventional 
procedure, in which the liberal orientations are constantly reasserted, and without much practical-
ity. 
The enlargement to Eastern and Central European countries raises new problems. An optimistic 
approach consists in underestimating its impact and expecting an additional 4% growth within the 
next 15 years for the new countries (Bchir et al, 2003) . However such an optimistic approach ought 
to be put into perspective. Although Central European countries seem to be in a better position, 
the most peripheral ones may become marginalised (Dupuch et al, 2003) . Regional and income in-
equalities are likely to increase, which poses the problem of the CAP and regional policy. Unlike 
with the previous enlargements, the EU-15's support is minimal since net transfers, for the 2004-
2006 period, will account for a yearly amount of 0.8% of the new members' GDP. 
The functioning of the EU-25 will have to face many difficulties in the years to come. The trend 
for the European Union to become a free trade area submitted to sole rules of competition will be 
reinforced. As in the 1980 s and 1990 s, growth will not really be the order of the day. This con-
struction fits in rather well with the liberal model, i.e. a huge single market, an independent ECB 
as the guarantor of price stability, a single financial market currently taking shape, competition 
and trade policies as incentives for the implementation of new liberal measures, a limited commu-
nity budget and nation States that are paralysed by budgetary constraints. Weak growth will be 
partly offset by the new investment opportunities that the liberalisation and privatisation of public 
services will continue to provide to private capital. Due to the increase of income and regional in-
equalities, there will be losers and winners. However, the absence of growth, persistent social ten-
sions, deadlocks of European policies and the backwardness in the fields of new technologies still 
remain a problem. The proposals contained in the Sapir (2003) report and aiming to boost 
Europe's growth ought to be considered in this context. Though they make up a coherent cluster 
within the framework of today's budgetary constraints, they constitute a minimalist approach to-
wards European reflation. 
2. A sketch for an alternative framework: the macroeconomic dimension
It is not our purpose here to bring answers to all the questions that are raised. However, we may
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sketch out several general orientations concerning the macroeconomic framework, the European 
Social Model and medium-term structural policies2. While alternative economic policy choices 
may be quite easily explained as far as their principles are concerned, their implementation is a 
more complex thing. It is necessary to make a distinction between an enlarged EU where the 
risks of paralysis are big and where priority should be given to the preservation of cohesion and 
a more restricted dimension within which more modest initiatives could be taken. 
An alternative policy will be based on a gradual increase of the European budget likely to play a 
stabilisation and redistribution role as well as to allow the funding of more active structural poli-
cies. The policy mix should mainly aim to sustain the demand. Its implementation will be made 
easier by the reform of the Stability Pact, an enlargement of the ECB's goals and the taking into 
account of wage policies. The European Social Model will be reasserted as a core element. The 
renewal of structural policies at EU level will concern both the research and industrial policies so 
as to support medium-term supply, the agricultural and regional policies that ought to be pur-
sued, and trade policy.
The early stages of a European budgetary policy 
As regards budgetary policy, the setting of a federal budget would theoretically be the most ade-
quate answer but it is out of reach. Two alternative solutions may then be simultaneously investi-
gated. 
The first one would mean a slight and progressive increase of Europe's budget in order to reach 
5% of GDP within a few years. Inner resources could be made available at European level corre-
sponding to some well-adapted taxes such as a tax on saving incomes and corporate profits, 
which would allow to limit the effects of fiscal competition ; a tax on financial transactions as well 
as on carbon dioxide emisssions. In return, new expenditures would be made at European level 
in such areas as research, trans-European networks or the protection of our environment. On ac-
count of its limited size, the European budget would, however, play a very modest stabilising role 
in case of asymmetrical shocks. 
To come to terms with such shocks, an Employment Stabilisation Fund could be created, follow-
 These orientations are partly to be found in the Euro-memorandums that have been published each year since 
1996 by the "European economists for an alternative economic policy in Europe group" ; www.memo-europe.uni-
bremen.de. They are presented more exhaustively in a collective work edited by Jorg Huffschmid "Economic policy 
for a Social Europe: a critique of neo-liberalism and proposals for alternative", published by Palgrave MacMillan, 
UK, in September 2005.The more political dimensions related to the exercise of democracy and to the respective 
roles of the Council, the Commission, national and European parliaments are not dealt with.
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ing the example of previous schemes that had been drawn up by the Commission itself (Italianer 
and  Pisani-Ferry, 1992) . Should its unemployment rate rise faster than the European average, a 
country would benefit from a transfer (either automatic or to be negotiated) from the European 
budget. According to estimates and provided these transfers are limited at 2% of GDP, the aver-
age annual cost for the European budget would be around 0.23% of GDP. In case of a negative 
shock of-1% of GDP, the stabilising and (redistributive) effect would be around 0.18% of GDP, that 
is to say comparable to the effect obtained in the USA through the federal budget. 
The second solution would be to accept a deficit of the European budget. Financed through secu-
rity issue, this deficit would remain modest, at around 1% of EU GDP so as to avoid too heavy a 
debt servicing in the future. With a debt capacity not exceeding 10% of GDP, long term debt serv-
icing itself would not exceed 0.35% of GDP. Another and easier solution would be to increase the 
IEB's and EBRD's borrowing capacities. The money thus collected could be transferred to mem-
ber states in case of a globally difficult economic situation such as asymmetric shock, in order to 
fund specific national programmes. Such programmes could be easier to implement than major 
public works as reflationary measures. These transfers could also be envisaged in case of asym-
metric shocks following a process similar to the Employment Stabilisation Fund's. 
Lastly, the Stability Pact should be reformed, taking into account some of proposals that have al-
ready been put forward, i.e. a public debt standard expressed in GDP %, a bearable current ac-
count standard, flexibility in the monitoring process so as to integrate effects of the economic 
situation.
ECB's independence and reinforced coordination 
The absence of any democratic control over monetary policy, nowhere else to be found, poses a 
major problem. This problem will remain difficult to solve as long as no fully European suprana-
tional legitimate authority is set up. Finding a solution will require a long process of political evo-
lution on account of member states' opposition to the adoption of a full-fledged federal organisa-
tion. 
The ECB's goal in terms of price stability (an inflation rate under but close to 2%) poses a problem. It 
contrasts with the British Chancellor's goal (between 2.5 and 3.5%) and also with the Fed's even less 
constraining position. Such a choice should be the subject of an in-depth public debate with politi-
cal leaders. An excessive inflation eradication may lead an economy to fall into the "liquidity trap", 
as illustrated by Japan's case. Complete price stability limits the efficiency of monetary policy as 
an instrument to support the economic activity. 
More fundamentally, broadening the ECB's goal so as to encompass full employment and social
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cohesion would restore employment its central position in the economic policy. Such a change 
would ease coordination problems and would put the ECB on line with other central banks' (includ-
ing the Fed's) goals. 
Furthermore, the ECB's modes of intervention ought to be diversified, on the model of Anglo-
Saxon Central Banks'. In those countries, the Central Bank may buy (or sell) and be the sole 
holder of Government's or Federal Agencies' security instead of holding them subject to repur-
chasing agreements, in the form of mere guarantee, within the framework of the refinancing op-
erations designed to help commercial banks. It may thus intervene more directly in the liquidity 
creation process so as to support the economic activity or curb deflationary pressures when it es-
timates that banks' refinancing demands are insufficient. Such a possibility was explicitly elimi-
nated in the ECB's case, notably because of the Bundesbank's strong opposition for fear of infla-
tion pressures linked to an excessive credit creation. A more dispassionate reappraisal of this 
point would be necessary. 
The exchange markets' instability points to another European monetary institutions' major flaw, i. 
e. the absence of any clear orientation in terms of external policy. The exchange rate policy is in 
fact completely in the ECB's hands and the European Council can only intervene in exceptional 
circumstances, for example in case of a "manifest misalignment". The prickly problem of the euro 
zone's international representation contributes to reinforcing this difficulty. The exchange rate 
policy ought to be appropriated again by the Council and the Eurogroup. The nomination of a 
"Mister Euro" to represent the Council 
would testify to this new role distribution. In general 
terms, the goal of the exchange rate policy could be the setting up of "flexible target zones" 
among the main currencies with more or less important fluctuation margins around reference 
parities calculated on the basis of fundamental equilibrium exchange rates. 
An explicit exchange rate policy would also make the elaboration of a policy mix more coherent. 
In addition, democratic principles would be better respected since the Council, as the representa-
tive of national governments, is the only one to have unquestioned democratic legitimacy. We 
would then get nearer to the institutional schemes prevailing in the USA or Japan where the Cen-
tral Bank is not the only one responsible for the exchange rate policy. The current economic situ-
ation shows the seriousness of the problems linked to the absence of European coordination 
mechanisms and to the ECB's status. Some progress could be made in several directions such as 
a better coordination of national fiscal policies following the efforts carried out since the late 
1990s with the development of long-term fiscal programming and the convergence of national fis-
cal procedures, the beginning of fiscal federalism and the acceptance of a European budget defi-
cit, the development of links between fiscal and monetary policies through the Eurogroup's
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strenghtened intervention capacities. 
Reintroducing wage policy 
To comply with the liberal doctrine according to which wage determination should be decentral-
ised, wage setting mechanisms have so far been largely ignored. The risk is that excessive decen-
tralisation of wage bargaining may induce destabilising dynamics. A better taking into account of 
income evolution appears as a necessary condition for an improved policy mix implementation at 
European level. Coordinated wage evolutions at European levels could imply the implementation 
of a multi-level bargaining system based on inflation rate anticipation but integrating national 
specificities and sectoral considerations. 
The integration of wages in collective negotiations at European level could take several forms in 
each country in keeping with its own  traditions  ; i. e. regional branch negotiations in Germany, 
interprofessional negotiations in Sweden, branch negotiations in the Netherlands, "social pacts" 
signed in several European countries with very different social structures in compliance with the 
deadlines fixed by the Maastricht criteria. The result should be national differentiated wage evolu-
tions, while maintaining a coherence with the policy mix components at the end of a gradual 
learning process. The never implemented "macroeconomic dialogue", though part of the Köln 
process, could then be rehabilitated. 
Rehabilitating the European Social Model 
Social welfare systems with contrasted forms varying from one country to another used to consti-
tute one of the foundations of the European Social Model and made it clearly different from the 
American and Japanese models. Facing budgetary constraints, there was mounting pressure for a 
"modernisation" of those systems , by laying the emphasis on individual responsibilities and mak-
ing individuals bear an increasing share of the financial burden. Depending on countries, this led 
to more or less extended privatisation waves and delegation toward financial actors. The Bolken-
stein directive, relative to services in domestic markets, is a threat to social welfare and public 
services. 
In the face of such evolutions, it is indispensable to rehabilitate the notion of a European Social 
Model based on three pillars, i. e. full employment but with jobs corresponding to workers' skills 
and getting them fair wages, social welfare for the elderly, the sick or the victims of accidents, 
based on an exhaustive social security system; social equity, that is to say the absence of social 
discrimination and excessive wage as well as spacial development inequalities and access to qual-
ity public services.
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Such a notion of a European Social Model contrasts with the more liberal, more nonegalitarian 
and less solid "American model", which is more individualistic in its approach and in which mar-
ket and competition mechanisms are the rule. It is against orientations clearly displayed in some 
of the Commission's recent documents. There can be several versions of this model according to 
each country's traditions and past experiences. The short or medium-term convergence of na-
tional models is not realistic. There is even a risk that the increasing mounting disparities and re-
inforced competition at play within the enlarged European Union may put foundations of the 
European model into question. Current trends ought to be reversed, by showing that social wel-
fare can be maintained on the basis of fairer-but just as efficient-public systems than private ones. 
This applies both to pay as you go pension schemes and to health care systems. Such questions 
obviously depend on national choices but are also increasingly submitted to constraints and direc-
tives imposed from Brussels. The rejection or the in-depth amendment of the Bolkenstein direc-
tive here appears to be an essential element at stake.
Furthermore, procedures could be implemented so as to compare and assess the policies carried 
out by the different member countries, based on the open coordination method that has been 
used within the framework of the European employment strategy since the late 1990s .
Minimum levels, varying according to countries, would be fixed as goals to be reached 
in terms of minimum wages, social welfare and pensions . In some cases, more con-
straining procedures could be envisaged so as to ensure the enforcement of minimum 
standards, e. g. in terms of minimum wage or pension level that would be fixed in % of 
the country's per capita income. In any case, a non-regression clause ought to be set 
up in order to avoid any form of social regression. 
In the context of a rising European budget, an amount varying between 0 .5% and 1% of 
EU GDP could be devoted to a European Social Fund to finance social transfers aim-
ing to reach some of the minimum levels previously fixed , notably in terms of pen-
sions or social welfare. Such a Fund would primarily help the less advanced union 
members gradually integrate the European Social Model. It would thus revive the har-
monisation and convergence principles that have ceaselessly governed the European 
construction for forty years.
Employment policies are another area in which progress could be made . Though these policies 
are unable to solve the unemployment problem, they play a positive role by contributing to help 
the less privileged social groups, rise qualification levels and improve working conditions . Within
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the European employment strategy framework implemented since 1997, the open coordination 
method has represented a unique process so as to help national policies through a repeated proc-
ess of information exchange and a harmonisation effort in their goals and programmes. All in all, 
the measures that have so far been taken have reinforced the trend towards more flexibility. 
However, the method can be retained and improved under several conditions. The restrictive 
framework of the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines as presently formulated and including the 
European employment strategy ought to be abandoned. Social partners should be more closely 
associated and workers' representation reinforced. The goals should go beyond mere employ-
ment rates. Recommendations for more flexibility ought to be reappraised in the light of bad re-
sults that have so far been obtained. Active employment policies ought to be more inspired by 
Scandinavian countries' experiences, giving more room to solidarity and offering wider choices 
than by schemes inspired by the workfare and more characterised by the mere disciplinary as-
pect.
As far as employment is concerned, European legislation is still in its embryonic stage, notably in 
the fields of part-time work, women's labour and workers' consulting. However, the standards that 
have been fixed are low and can even be wrongly used by the most advanced countries to justify 
backwardness in these areas. Enforcement conditions are not constraining in less advanced coun-
tries. Such a situation ought to be reversed considering the fact that the upward convergence of 
labour conditons is one of the Treaties' goals. Such a necessarily gradual evolution could primar-
ily concern the following points: the reinforcement of workers' rights to training and education 
and the substantial improvement of labour conditions in some atypical jobs. 
     3. Towards more balanced structural policies 
In terms of structural policies, the European institutional framework is characterised by several 
major trends ; i. e. the preeminence of the community competition policy, the Single Market 
logic giving priority to economies of scale, the weakness of the community research policy, the 
absence of a truly European industrial policy, the overpowering CAP and regional policy, and 
lastly too liberal a European trade policy. Most structural public interventions are organised ac-
cording to national specific models. However, in many cases the European competition policy 
plays an increasingly important role by imposing restrictions to national interventions which are 
not offset by broader interventions at European level, in accordance with the liberal doctrine. A 
return towards a more balanced situation is highly desirable, by giving impetus to a more active 
research policy, establishing an industrial policy at community level, reinforcing public services,
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giving regional policy a new orientation, maintaining—while thoroughly transforming it—the CAP 
and lastly redefining the European trade policy. 
A more active research policy 
The reasons for the deterioration of external performances in high technology areas in the 1980s 
and 1990s are many but essentially lie in the weaknesses of research policy, both at European 
and national levels. Compared with US policy in these sectors, national policies supported by di-
versified national innovation systems have lacked coordination. Global  funding, has been insuffi-
cient. The average R&D European effort represents around 1.9% of GDP against 2.5% in the USA 
and Japan and no country, with the exception of Sweden, does better than America. 
Research and technological development framework programmes (RDFPs) have suffered from 
several shortcomings : the insufficient commitment of large companies that have been reluctant to 
cooperate on major projects and have often proposed second-ranking ones, too complex a proce-
dure that has been an obstacle for small and medium-sized firms, a multiplicity of goals which is 
hardly compatible with the uniqueness of community rules, the inadequate character of the pre-
competitiveness notion, the perverse effects of the unanimity rule to the detriment of a necessary 
focus on priority projects and leading to sprinkling, the use by some countries of the RDFP as a 
substitute for dwindling national funding ; and lastly the quantitative weakness (15 bn euros for 
the 5th RDPF between 1998 and 2002 ; 17.5 bn euros for the 6th one, between 2002 and 2006) . 
As for the EUREKA programme, it is an intergovernmental cooperation mechanism whose flexi-
bility is acknowledged and based on companies' and laboratories' initiatives. However, it has been 
subject to progressive erosion due to some nations' lesser commitment, the smaller size of 
funded projects and a loss of financial credibility. 
Several improvements have been carried out in the last years. The abandonment of the rule of u-
niqueness since June 1999 has opened the way for larger selectivity at RDFP level. The possiblity 
to exceed the pre-competitiveness criterion should permit the funding of projects closer to indus-
trial application. The 2000 Lisbon Summit clearly stated the will to catch up in the knowledge 
economy area but the mobilised means have so far consisted in mere incantations. It is necessary 
to go further than this.
Rationalising procedures 
RDFP procedures have become too complex. Specific regulations ought to be implemented ac-
cording to the nature of operations that are funded, distinguishing between public research, of a 
more fundamental nature, and industrial research :
 Community-ftmded support to small and med 
ferred to regional 
cohesion goal 
nanced by Structural Funds.
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as far as long-term, upstream research is concerned, greater freedom of proposals 
ought to prevail, essentially based on public funding; 
as for industrial research, the definition of priorities would be based on firms' continu-
ous participation, with a real commitment from bigger firms, but the latter should not 
be the only ones to impose their views; 
for short-term projects and in order to bring more direct support to small and medium 
size firms, the benefits from the EUREKA programme ought to be mobilised. This 
programme, while keeping its flexible functioning, ought to be integrated to the RDFP 
so as to overcome today's deadlocks. 
 r-ftmded support to s all and ium-size industries' innovation ought to be trans-
                          Some of the RDFP aids actually corrrespond to a 
ought to be integrated to the regional aid policy fi-
Setting up new means both at budgetary level and at the level of the instruments that are mobilised 
    — The RDFP financial provisions ought to be increased to around 0.4% of EU GDP, so as 
       to permit the funding of major schemes at European level without dismantling national
         programmes.
Industrial policy an,d major prop 




Specific cooperation programmes could be launched in separate areas, based on 
autonomous but somehow continuous budgets and structures. 
European technological agencies in charge of the promotion and coordination, at Euro-
pean level, of programmes in the fields of IT and biotechnologies could be set up. 
European public research organisations, more in charge of fundamental research, 
could also be set up. 
The creation of a European patent is a key issue for the protection of intellectual prop-
erty in sensitive sectors like biotechnologies and IT. The cost of patents in Europe is 
much superior to what it is in America and a European patent would limit the complex 
nature of the procedure and reduce translation and examination costs. 
! d •ammmes at European level 
T to be found at community level and remains unfamiliar to 
i  states' culture. It was acknowledged in 1994 only under the name of "industrial 
mess policy". It is restricted to horizontal measures aiming to improve companies' envi-
                    overarching competition policy. A broader approach to in-
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dustrial policy appears necessary and might be devised around the following points.
Rehabilitating big public programmes at European level 
Several fields would be concerned. First of all, technological programmes concerning specific pro-
jects such as the Galileo project, which was revived at the March 2002 Barcelona Summit, or the 
troop carrier project. These high technology projects would stimulate several European research 
groups and laboratories and lead to the development of cooperation networks. 
Secondly, infrastructure programmes that would appear as necessary complements to the liberali-
sation policies implemented in public services. Europe could set up masterplans in the areas of 
transports, electricity, gas, telecoms or the post office, including either publicly or privately 
funded investment programmes. Operation management would no longer depend on intergovern-
mental coordination but on financially independent operators in charge of the achievement of indi-
vidual projects. Rail transport is the most exemplary sector where to initiate this kind of project, 
as illustrated by the December 2003 Commission's recovery-plan.
Setting up regulation instruments 
National regulation agencies have been created in several service sectors (telecoms, electricity) 
within the framework of liberalisation policies. The setting up of European regulation bodies, con-
nected to these national agencies, seems necessary. 
Well-designed standardisation at European level may be a powerful instrument to reinforce Euro-
pean firms' position, as illustrated by the GSM standard for mobile phones. Such a practice could 
be extended to many areas (technologies and clean goods, insulating materials) . The reinforcement of 
standardisation bodies common to all European countries is to be encouraged. 
Sectoral interventions, promoting specific infrastructures or instruments, could be set up in coop-
eration with the firms in the concerned sectors.
A more pragmatic competition policy 
The European policy aiming to control anticompetitive agreements should be less concerned with 
maintaining strong competition considered as an efficiency factor. The economic dimension ought 
to be better integrated by admitting that in many sectors firms' competitiveness is based on the 
lasting relationships existing between different protagonists, authorizing trade alliances and pro-
posing standard contracts for cooperation agreements. 
The monitoring of concentration, as the key device of competition policy, should also be made 
more flexible. The definition of a "pertinent market", on which the risk of having leaders is as-
         Slide or growth in Europe?Alternative economic policies and the European social model 15 
sessed, ought to be spread to the whole world insteaad of being limited to the sole European—if 
not sometimes national—dimension. A dynamic vision integrating markets' future evolution in-
stead of being restricted to the sole impact of  efffective competition should prevail. Concentration 
is generally more limited in Europe than in America and medium-size firms are weaker. Given 
the circumstances, European firms should be able to reinforce their positions without being pe-
nalised against non-European competitors. 
Governmental aids are banned to prevent unilateral measures from creating imbalances and dis-
torting competition. Theoretically, only the aids having a general impact and not benefiting cer-
tain firms or sectors are allowed. Practically, some dispensations already exist to help weaker re-
gions, support small and medium-size firms as well as the environment and R&D sectors. The ex-
isting monitoring devices should be more flexible and coherent. By being more flexible, they 
would not aim, as at present, to promote a unilateral strategy of national aid reduction. By being 
more coherent, they would guarantee a better articulation of national aids monitoring with exist-
ing European policies, notably in terms of regional aids financed by Structural Funds or research-
oriented aids. 
Preserving and reinforcing public services 
Public services, also known as "general economic interest services", according to the Commis-
sion's terminology, correspond to the supply of goods and services that are essential to an individ-
ual's daily life and to the exercise of his fundamental rights: guaranteed access to energy, health 
care, transports, telecommunications, education all over the territorey, without any discrimination 
and on equal basis for everyone. They contribute to economic, social and territorial cohesion and 
may be provided, under certain conditions, either by administrations or by public or private com-
panies. They are at the heart of the "European Social Model" but have been directly affected by 
the liberalisation and competitive policy implemented since the 1990s. 
In the EU founding treaties, competition remains the basic principle, though there is a place for 
"general economic interest services" , by allowing nation states to define, with a relative auton-
omy, the range of their public services. On the other hand WTO, with its General Agreement on 
Trade of Services (GATS) , constitutes a general framework which is particularly constraining and 
worrying for public services. The Bolkenstein directive accentuates this phenomenon. However, 
within such an unfavourable context, three points ought to be stressed as they give some room 
for manoeuvre :
— The acknowledgement of the "network" notion in various directives
, characterised by
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        persistently increasing yields in some sectors of activity, justifies the maintaining of a 
        monopoly status in the corresponding areas and permits public interventions but with-
        out clearly explaining their form. 
    — The obligation of a "universal service" is also clearly admitted in sectoral directives 
        with the following definition "a cluster of minimum services of a given quality, accessi-
        ble to everyone at an affordable price". 
     — The "general economic interest service" mission was recently reasserted in recent 
        documents, notably in the European Charter of Fundamental Rights. Until now, these 
        texts have had little operative impact but the principle of a European law may open a 
        new legal framework. 
Three options may be envisaged to preserve the role of public services. 
The first one consists in allowing public services to keep their national derogatory status from 
European competition within the framework of clear directives that would give each member 
state the freedom to specify its public service missions and the practical details of their deploy-
ment according to its own traditions (funding methods, private or public operators) .
The second option, more ambitious, is based on the principle of framework directive specifying 
the foundations of public services at the European level and setting up regulatory institutions. A 
broader notion of "public service" than the mere "universal service" would be chosen. The gen-
eral framework directive would then be adjusted to each sector of activity, taking its specificities 
into account. Liberalisation should not be the only way and could be combined with inter-firm co-
operation. Any new step towards liberalisation ought to be specifically assessed so as to take into 
account the problems previously mentioned.
The third option goes further by setting up a European platform of public services that would be 
made compulsory to all member states, include common objectives and joint interventions of 
European and national regulators. Such an option would mean reinforced control over increased 
competition and privatisation policies. But this goal seems difficult to reach considering each 
country's previous practical experiences and very different traditions.
In relation to WTO and within the GATS negotiation framework, the European Union's mandate 
which negotiates on behalf of all its member states should be based on a clear idea of the public 
service notion at European level. Public services, which are commonly seen as a way for any indi-
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vidaul to exert his fundamental rights, should enjoy a specific status during negotiations. The 
Bolkenstein directive, which is likely to deeply question public services and social welfare sys-
tems, ought to be thoroughly amended, with special attention paid to the health care and educa-
tion sectors. It should be set back in the context of a directive on public services.
Lastly, the liberalisation of network services ought to be accompanied by an industrial policy at 
the level of national or European regulators, handling the distorsions that inevitably occur and in 
charge of the relations between public and private companies. This policy should also contribute 
to the setting up of an ambitious European infrastructure policy, likely to increase the EU's poten-
tial growth, and based on a broad appreciation of network externalities.
A continued regional policy in the context of enlargement 
European regional policies play a significant role since both Structural and Cohesion Funds ac-
counted for an average 0.45% of EU GDP between 1994 and 1999, with much more significant 
funding for southern countries. A decrease has been programmed (an  annual  0.4% of EU GDP) for 
the period 2000-2006. The efficiency of Structural Funds in the reduction of regional disparities is 
a subject of debate. According to some, they do not seem to have much impact (Fagerberg and 
Verspagen, 2000) or else, though they are significant at an econometric level, their impact remains 
limited. The Structural Funds that are invested in infrastructures seem to have reinforced the 
convergence process between countries by accelerating the growth of poor countries' already ad-
vantaged regions without reducing the internal regional inequalities. The efficiency of these Struc-
tural Funds seems to be all the greater as the concerned region is richer (Martin, 1999) .
At operational level, the setting up of projects funded by Structural Funds and their subsequent 
implementation require complex interactions between regional, national and European institu-
tions. In many countries, the setting up and subsequent management of these programmes ap-
pear to be overcentralised. Given the complexity of community files, the exacting controlstaking 
place at national level and the recourse to co-funding, Structural Funds are often very slowly used 
up. 
Beyond these usual problems, the EU's enlargement raises considerable challenges (Begg, 2002) . 
The adhesion to the EU of new countries means a lower average EU income per capita and bars 
many regions currently benefiting from those Structural Funds from being eligible (below 75%) , 
though their situation has not changed at all. According to the Commission's 2002 Report on co-
hesion, the number of the EU-15 regions below the elibility threshold would fall from 46 to 19. It 
would be possible to raise this threshold to the same level as that of Cohesion Funds (90% of the
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EU income per capita) but it would entail budgetary constraints that would be very difficult to over-
come within the framework of a European budget limited at 1.27% of EU GDP. Concerning new 
members, it is envisaged to limit transfers to 4% of GDP per country to account for their limited 
absorption capacity, following what could be observed during the enlargement to Southern Euro-
pean countries. This would represent an estimated cost ranging between 0.18% and 0.38% of EU 
GDP, depending on whether calculations are made at current prices or at PPP. Such a budget al-
location does not seem to be unbearable.
Two scenarios may be envisaged if one rejects the full redeployment strategy of regional policy 
towards Eastern and Central European countries, as it was put forward by Sapir (2003) in his re-
port. 
—The more favourable one proposes a European budget that would increase significantly (by 
around 5% of GDP within a few years) . This would give more room for manoeuvre, notably to raise the 
Structural Funds eligibility threshold. A larger number of weaker regions could thus benefit from 
transfers, particularly in the less developed countries of the EU-15, which would preserve the soli-
darity mechanisms across the whole EU. 
—Should such a scenario not be decided on an account of political constraints , a less ambitious 
compromise could then be sought. Like in the previous enlargements, new Structural Funds 
could be created in favour of the new members with a maximum budget allocation of 0.4% of EU 
GDP. Such funding could be ensured thanks to new instruments issued both by the EIB and 
EBRD. The current Structural and Cohesion Funds would be redistributed among the EU-15 
members with a renegotiation of the eligibility threshold and allocation procedures. 
In both scenarios the Structural Funds procedure ought to be reformed for more efficiency. More 
autonomy ought to be given to the local, regional and national development programmes that are 
co-financed by Structural Funds by simplifying the Commission's control procedures. More inter-
action would be achieved with the previously mentioned European technological and trans-
European infrastructure programmes. 
A reformed CAP 
Considering the real problems posed by the CAP, there have been many reform proposals and 
the CAP has effectively been softened since the 80s. Pressure for a more radical reform has 
mounted since the late 1990s. The general trend has been to reintroduce the market notion. Four 
proposals may in fact be brought out. 
—The renationalisation of the CAP, i. e. its abolition, is a very alluring prospect in the UK and is
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also to be found in Sapir's report  (2003)  . The British are in favour of free imports for agricultural 
products with guaranteed prices paid to farmers, the difference between guaranteed prices and 
market prices being covered by subsidies that would be renationalised and whose amounts would 
be fixed by each state. This proposal is apparently clever as it is open to developing countries' im-
ports and in keeping with free trade principles. But it poses several problems. Consumers would 
in fact bear the effects of the strong instability of agricultural markets. Setting guaranteed 
prices—as well as production levels—is an akward thing to do. If these prices are free, overproduc-
tion appears as a serious risk. The setting of individual quotas would be indispensable but it is 
rarely put forward. 
—The Commission is trying to reform the CAP so as to reduce its cost in the enlargement con-
text, find room again for budgetary manoeuvres and make it acceptable in international negotia-
tions. Its position is to alter the nature of aids and to switch from surface or per livestock ones to 
a system that would encourage agricultural practices and the production of amenities.The mecha-
nism linking aids to production would thus be dismantled and production, as well as prices, 
would become market-oriented. This position, in keeping with Germany's, at least encourages 
"good practices" . But its reference to the market, which remains central, poses a problem since 
history shows that the market itself is unable to ensure proper regulation in the agricultural sec-
tor. The compromise reached by the Ministers of Agriculture in June 2003 is a curious, probably 
transitory mixture, lacking in coherence and essentially destined to give a better image in interna-
tional negotiations. The decoupling will start in 2005 or 2007, according to countries. It will re-
main partial for some products while it will not apply to others. 
—Agricultural problems play a key role within the enlargement to Central and Eastern European 
countries. Community subsidies have been limited at 25% of current amounts per ha or livestock 
head, progressively rising so as to reach 100% in 2013. This ceiling, which is frowned down upon 
by new members, is justified in the Commission's eyes by the constraints imposed by the current 
budgetary allocation, by the fear of an uncontrolled increase of agricultural surpluses in case of 
higher subsidies and lastly by the redistribution problems of internal incomes to candidate coun-
tries resulting from subsidies that would be too high, compared to average national incomes. 
—International negotiations within the WTO framework also raise a last series of questions . 
Within WTO, the debate got off to a bad start with Anglo-Saxon countries seeking to preserve 
and promote their interests behind alluring proposals: the acceptance of subsidies encouraging 
"good practices"
, the progressive decrease of the subsidies creating imbalances, the defence of 
developing countries by the Cairns group of countries that would only benefit highly productive 
agricultural countries and not the most disadvantaged developing ones. Within the 2002 Farm Bill
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framework, the United States re-established the practice of guaranteed prices, while putting hypo-
critically forward again their will to reduce these agricultural subsidies so as to eventually return 
to the market mechanism system. A badly handled dismantling of the CAP within WTO would 
harm European farmers without bringing remedies to developing countries with traditional agri-
cultural practices.
Within such a context, it is preferable to return to the "Rooseveltian" principles that were used to 
lay the foundations of the agricultural policy in the mid-1930s and openly recognise the "agricul-
tural exception". Agricultural products cannot be solely governed by international trade laws. The 
instable character of agricultural markets, by increasing risks, has very negative effects on the 
whole agricultural sector which, in the medium-term, will largely exceed the gains resulting from 
comparative advantages (the risk of rural areas' desertification and disintegration in European countries, the 
absence of any short or medium- term alternative activity in the poorest countries) . The benefits from trade 
development can appear only if the pernicious effects of free markets are corrected by agricul-
tural policy measures, in developed as well as in developing countries. The lessons from the past 
show us that this implies measures to support prices, on condition that overproduction phenom-
ena should be avoided thanks to production control measures (Boussard, 2003) . 
Guaranteed price systems ought to be coupled with production quotas. These prices must be suf-
ficiently high so as to lead farmers to increase their production. Quotas must be individualised 
and fixed so that the sum total of individual (and national) ones should remain slightly inferior to 
the European Union's overall consumption. Overproduction is thus avoided and free market 
forces are left at play to reach the equilibrium between Europe's internal demand and internal 
and world supply. Consequently, imports are free within such a framework. If it were imple-
mented throughout the European Union, such a mechanism would contribute to stabilise the 
world system. Consumer prices are fixed on the basis of world prices, and consumers have to 
bear the aftermath of international markets' fluctuations. The difference between consumer prices 
and the prices guaranteed to farmers is covered by public subsidies. Prices are guaranteed in 
each zone according to its development and productivity levels. Production quotas may be ex-
changed, but not between different zones so as to avoid geographical concentration phenomena. 
Lastly, individual quotas may be used to reduce production, notably in the case of big farmers. 
Production quotas guarantee rents that can be assessed through quota price variations, since they 
are tradable. Regular negotiations may help prevent excessive rent increases.
Within this framework, Eastern European countries' integration could take place on a more bal-
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ance basis without distortions between countries since the same rules would apply. Quotas would 
be evaluated in each country on a historical basis, with productions whose future growth potential 
would be limited to prevent overproduction fears. Guaranteed prices would be sufficiently high to 
ensure farmers a significant increase of their incomes and enable them to modernise their pro-
duction methods. On the other hand, these prices should not be too high so as to avoid distor-
tions with the evolution of non-agricultural incomes. 
Likewise, a more balanced solution could be reached within the Euromed Agreements framework. 
The principle of free imports would open new opportunities for those countries' agricultures. 
However, they tend to have a deficit in their agricultural product trade because of the rise of their 
cereal imports due to demographic pressure. They are confronted with the necessity to develop 
their food self-sufficiency, which would imply the setting up of dynamic agricultural policies that 
would somehow differ from the free trade principles.
All in all, the proposed solution poses two kinds of problems. 
—Fixing guaranteed prices is always a difficult exercise implying difficult negotiations, with much 
pressure from all sides. However, the experience at European level of 40 years of CAP may make 
the exercise possible. The existence of periodical negotiations guarantees that the necessary ad-
justments will be made. 
—This proposal to reform the CAP falls out of step with WTO's principles , which should not be 
surprising since it is based on the idea that agricultural goods cannot be solely governed by inter-
national trade laws. Within the WTO framework, agricultural subsidies can only be used in a very 
restrictive way. Some are acceptable (the "green box" : environment subsidies, rural development subsi-
dies...) while based on the decoupling principle (no links with production levels or current prices) . Oth-
ers are not (the "orange box" : price supporting measures or subsidies that are linked to production 
amounts) or ought to be gradually reduced. The "blue box" category is intermediate and corre-
sponds to the situation in which farmers have to limit their production, which may be the case 
with quotas. 
A more balanced European trade policy
New orientations for WTO 
For developed countries, WTO is a forum of negotiations where concessions are exchanged so as 
to limit counter-productive conflicts by seeking to set up a regulated international trade frame-
work based on the respect of competition and benefiting all on an equal par. It currently functions
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as the perfect instrument for the dissemination of liberal policies by imposing across-the-board 
liberalisation rules without taking into account either national specificities (choice of a less non-
egalitarian model, social model) , or unequal development levels. WTO is largely dominated by big 
powers, mainly the USA and the EU, contributing to the early setting up of the main orientations 
of negotiations. Such a functioning is increasingly criticised by large and heterogeneous coalitions 
that may lead to deadlock situations during negotiations. But the organisation remains unchanged 
with its heavy and complex procedures, and the liberalisation process continues to serve the big 
powers' economic interests.
Three points could be put forward by the EU : the democratisation of WTO, the reintroduction of 
a more differentiated treatment of subjects and the respect of fundamental rights.
The WTO's democratisation is necessary in order to deprive the big powers of their 
de facto control power and establish a more balanced functioning. This implies giving 
more power to developing countries within WTO by going beyond today's basic and 
formal rule of one vote per country. Agenda setting should be the result of global ne-
gotiations, with more transparency. Conference and working group presidencies ought 
to be more balanced. The WTO's functioning needs complete overhauling. 
Liberalisation rules should no longer apply across-the-board to developing countries 
but take the inequalities in their development levels into account. The principle of a 
differentiated treatment was deprived of all its substance by the liberalisation wave. It 
should be restored within WTO and it should be admitted that constraints can no 
longer be exerted as before considering the existing obstacles to development. In-
come redistribution mechanisms at global level could be included in the WTO's princi-
ples according to development levels. Developing countries could thus benefit from a 
relaxation in the management of Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) , just like what has 
just been achieved in the field of pharmaceutical products, or maintain some protec-
tive measures as regards market openings, public procurement policies or foreign in-
vestment inflows. 
The respect of fundamental rights (the right to health care, the respect of fundamental labour 
standards, the defence of public services recognised to be indispensable to an individual's exercise 
of his or her fundamental rights) ought to be put forward along with the environment pro-
tection which is already admitted by WTO. It should not be considered as an alibi 
likely to cause the resurgence of protectionist practices calling the principle of free
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        competition into question, as often denounced by the  WTO's experts. 
New lines for negotiations 
These new lines could lead the EU to propose new orientations within WTO towards developing 
and industrialised countries alike. The Dispute Settlement Body's (DSB) functioning should also 
be completely reconsidered.
In relation to developing countries, northern countries should negotiate favourable asymmetries so 
as to allow them to catch up with their development within the next 20 years. Several areas are 
concerned by this prospect. 
Temporary protectionist measures could be accepted, combined with northern countries' contin-
ued opening. Contrary to the positions that are currently put forward, the EU would stop con-
straining countries to open their markets more widely and opposing those that refuse to lower 
their customs duties. A softer and less arrogant approach, taking more into account each coun-
try's or area's specificities, should prevail. 
A similar asymmetry should also apply to the "Singapore subjects" concerning competition, inter-
national investment, access to public markets and trade exchange improvement. As already de-
cided in July 2004, the EU should no longer put these questions—even the last two—forward. The 
EU should also stop promoting negotiations on these themes with the countries accepting to do 
so within the framework of multilateralism. 
Previous regional agreements, such as the Cotonou or Euromed agreements, ought to be simi-
larly softened. While intra-zone liberalisation is to be encouraged so as to increase regional inte-
gration, favourable asymmetries for less developed regions ought to be negotiated. 
Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) agreements ought to be made more flexible in favour of devel-
oping countries so as to encourage the promotion of national industries, i. e. by shortening the 
duration of patents and introducing derogatory measures to the regulation on imitations. 
Transfers could be made towards the countries providing a skilled labour force so as to cover the 
education costs they have to bear. Such transfers would make the policy on temporary skilled la-
bour towards immigrants that is currently enforced in the EU more acceptable. Lastly aid to de-
veloping countries, that is currently not only insufficient but also badly affected and used, ought 
to be increased, provided its management is completely overhauled.
In relation to the other industrialised countries and mainly the USA, and as regards its trade policy, 
the EU should put forward the European model specificities that it wishes to keep without limit-
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ing itself to the sole cultural exception. The "European Social Model" and its long-term implica-
tions for health and redistribution policies comes first, but also the public services which are not 
limited to the mere notion of universal service. This point also refers to the GATS renegotiation 
that will be dealt with later on. 
On the other hand, the EU should aim to restore a more balanced position of its different part-
ners' positions in at least three areas : European public procurements and European financial 
markets which were opened without any counterpart and where the reciprocity principle ought to 
be the rule, IPRs about which the EU is increasingly on the defensive. 
In terms of IPRs, research insufficiencies within the EU play a key role. The inability to set up a 
true community patent valid across the whole EU ought to be overcome too. National Offices' lob-
bying is here at issue, but also the shortcomings of some national courts that are competent in 
the subject combined with the absence of a European Court. Besides these truly European weak-
nessses, America's excessively dominant positions, notably regarding the patenting of living be-
ings, ought to be more strongly opposed (Coriat, 2002) . 
The DSB's functioning ought to be completely overhauled so as to make it less unfavourable to-
wards developing countries. While guaranteeing the multilateralism principle, the DSB ought to 
be deprivatised and placed under the United Nations' control. It would be indispensable to estab-
lish a clear division between areas likely to be unreservedly subjected to negotiations within 
WTO and those that ought to be placed under the aegis of the United Nations' competent 
authorities so that rules and standards could be set up. WTO would then be asked to enforce 
trade sanctions within this framework. For instance, concerning IPRs on pharmaceutical products, 
World Health Organisation (WHO) ought to be the place where rules are agreed upon in terms 
of IPRs and trade according to the populations' needs and sanitary conditions. As for agricultural 
products, a distinction must be made between natural products and genetically modified ones 
whose trade regulation ought to be set up with the Food and Agricultural Organisation's (FAO) 
competent bodies. The negotiations concerning industrial goods and general services would be 
unreservedly part of WTO. Lastly, as far as social standards are concerned, aid to development is 
undoubtedly the best way to make them respected in developing countries. However, if the Inter-
national Labour Organization (ILO) is to play its monitoring role in this area, trade sanctions 
could be imposed within WTO on the countries that do not respect fundamental labour standards. 
A global institution coming under the United Nations would ultimately cover and coordinate 
WTO's, FAO's and ILO's sectoral authorities whose contribution would be requested to set up 
those rules and standards. Political legitimacy and better coordination would thus be ensured
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From a more operational point of view, the WTO's sanction mechanisms ought to be reconsid-
ered so as to reinforce their efficiency by providing compensations for damages and effectively re-
quiring the sectors responsible for the sentence to make their contribution, which is not the case 
today. Lastly, on account of the complex issues dealt with the DSB, the less developed countries 
ought to enjoy specific technical support.
As regards their form, negotiations ought to be carried out in the EU's name, not by a Commis-
sioner who makes proposals and then gets mandated to negotiate by the Council, but by a Coun-
cil representative, a Mr Trade, with clearer political legitimacy as the representative of national 
governments. 
Renegotiating GATS 
The Commission's 2003 liberalisation proposals were, its own terms, "significant and substantial". 
Whereas education, health and culture were not concerned and while the post office and telecom-
munications retain their universal service goal, the GATS's current framework does not provide 
any guarantee concerning future negotiations. In its principle, GATS encourages gradual and gen-
eral liberalisation. Many declarations show that health and education will eventually be more con-
cerned (Jennar, 2003) . 
If such a drift is to be avoided, it is essential that the EU's mandate negotiating on behalf of all 
the Member States should lie on a clear conception of a European public services going beyond 
the mere notion of a universal service. Public services correspond to the supply of goods and 
services that are essential to an individual's daily life and to the exercise of his fundamental 
rights. They are essential to the nation's economic and social cohesion. They should enjoy a spe-
cific status during negotiations so as to be clearly excluded from any subsequent liberalisation 
proposal. 
     4. The implementation procedures 
As a mere indicator, the total cost of the previously sketched out policy is estimated to reach, 
when fully operating, an annual 2% of the EU-15 GDP, with the following distribution : 0.4% to re-
search, 0.4% to industrial policy and major programmes, 0.4% to regional policy in favour of East-
ern and Central European countries, 0.3% to the Employment Stabilisation Fund, 0.3% to the So-
cial Fund. Both the CAP and the regional policy in favour of the EU-15 are supposed to represent 
globally unchanged amounts.
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While the budget allocation remains globally acceptable, the conditions for the imlplementation of 
this policy are difficult in today's context. Any substantial increase of the European budget, even 
if it is very progressive, seems unrealistic. The EU-15 deadlock situations will only be more fre-
quent in an enlarged Union. It is necessary then to distinguish between what can be envisaged at 
the level of a EU-25 to avoid dilution in a sort of European United Nations Organisation, submit-
ted to reinforced competition and mounting inequalities, and what can be rebuilt on a more mod-
est scale to give more impetus to medium-term growth, while respecting the constraints imposed 
by short-term steering. 
Ensuring the cohesion of an enlarged Europe 
The European Union's enlargement was necessary from a political point of view but it will be diffi-
cult to maintain the cohesion of an enlarged Union. Whereas the expected medium-term 
consequences for Eastern and Central European countries are positive, the short-term risks of an 
economic slowdown, mounting inequalities and polarised activities are real. In this prospect , the 
extension of both regional and common agricultural policies to Eastern and Central European 
countries appears necessary. Regional policy ought to be linked to some of the big technological 
and infrastructure programmes that are also envisaged. Lastly, in order to increase short-term 
flexibility, the exchange rate policy ought to avoid too rapid an integration to the euro zone in 
spite of some Eastern and Central European countries' pressure. As a counterpart, the euro zone 
countries ought to provide some aid towards financial stabilisation. All in all, supposing the CAP 
extension is achieved without any budget increase thanks to the reform currently under way, the 
financial burden would mainly concern the regional policy extension which could be achieved 
through new instruments issued by the EIB and EBRD. We should not forget either to add up 
the progressive gearing up of the European Social Fund. 
Increasing the euro zone's capacities to react 
The EU-15 is divided into two, the euro zone and the non-euro zone, for a period which may last 
long. The consequences of this situation on short-term regulation methods are significant. The 
euro zone's capacities to react must be improved, which implies a reinforcement of the Euro- 
group's means of action, a deep reform of the GSP, broader goals for the ECB and real coordina-
tion with the Eurogroup, the taking into account of wage policy and lastly the setting up of an 
Employment Stabilisation Fund to handle asymmetrical shocks. This last measure would be the 
only one to have a budgetary impact. A last and non-permanent instrument would remain to be 
devised to sustain growth, for instance under the form of a European loan with transfers to Mem-
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 ber States to fund recovery programmes. Progress in these different aspects is likely to remain 
very uneven, notably on account of the heterogeneous nature of the euro zone countries, which 
may imply continuing difficulties. It is still impossible to say whether more progress would be 
achieved on a more modest scale. 
Mobilising resources around major structuring programmes 
Structural policies might open further opportunities for individualised programmes in different ar-
eas: master plans and large programmes in the transport, telecommunications or energy sectors 
whose implementation would be entrusted to European operators with autonomous budgets at 
their disposal, the creation—in the main fields—of European technological agencies and European 
research agencies. The possibilities of enhanced cooperation open up useful perspectives but the 
practicalities of their implementation ought to be made easier. The nature of expenditures 
(medium-term growth supporting investments) and the required financing amounts justify the recourse 
to loans mobilising EIB's or ECB's new instruments. Such a prospect may turn out a success but 
previous experiences have shown the heaviness and slowness of these operations. The medium-
term impact of the whole process could thus remain quantitatively limited unless it were given 
considerable impetus.
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